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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AITDREY

w. TAYLOR' et al. '
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation, et al.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Consolidated Cases

Defendants-Respondents. )
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
)
JOSEPH FAZZIO, et al.
)
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
)
a Delaware corporation, et al., )
)
Defendants-Respondents. )

No. 19160
and
No. 19161

~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-appellants Audrey W. Taylor, Maxine T.
Fazzio, Joseph Fazzio, and Fuel Exploration, Inc. appeal from
judgments of the Seventh Judicial District Court for Uintah
'•unty, the Honorable Richard C.· Davidson presiding, dismissing
~mended
-~l1dated

complaints in these actions, which are now
for purposes of appeal.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants commenced these actions in the District
Court on May 19, 1982, seeking, among other things, to
terminate the leasehold rights of Phillips Petroleum Company in
land located in Uintah County.

(R. 13; R. 16.)*

Appellants

amended ther complaints on June 4 and June 10, 1982.
R. 54.)

(R. 48;

On July 26, 1982, Phillips moved to dismiss

appellants' First through Fourth Causes of Action in Case No.
19160 and, on similar grounds, moved to dismiss appellants'
First through Sixth Causes of Action in Case No. 19161.
(R. 91; R. 107.)

At the close of oral argument on November 9,

1982, the District Court invited the parties to make any
additional submissions they deemed advisable.

(Tr. 55.)

On

October 20, 1982, appellants submitted additional materials
pursuant to the District Court's invitation.
Case No. 19161.)

(R. 211-30 in

On December 30, 1982, the District court

entered judgment granting Phillips' motions to dismiss in their
entirety.

(R. 260 in Case No. 19161.)

On January 14, 1983,

* Where references are made to the records on appeal of both

consolidated cases, the first reference will be to the
record in Case No. 19160; the second reference will be to
the record in Case No. 19161. The transcript of the
District Court hearing in these cases. which appears at page
123 of the record in Case No. 19160, will be designated
"Tr."
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appellants filed a "Motion to Reconsider" (R. 131; R. 339) and
a Motion to Amend (R. 133; R. 316) in both cases.

On February

8. 1983, the District Court orally advised counsel for
appellants that these motions would be denied.
No. 19161.)

(R. 296 in Case

On the same day, the District Court certified its

judgments for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(R. 124; R. 293.)

filed on March 7, 1983.

Notices of appeal were

(R. 151; R. 369.)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Phillips seeks an order of the Court affirming the
judgments of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statements of facts contained in the appellants' two
briefs in these cases are unnecessarily confusing, in part
because of appellants' curious decision to make two lawsuits
out of this dispute instead of one.

Both actions involve the

same oil and gas lease; both turn on the same questions of
law.

Appellants' statements of facts are also misleading

because they include certain facts that are completely
immaterial and omit others that are both undisputed and
essential to the decision of this Court.
The following, therefore, is a summary of the undisputed
Facts in the record before the District Court:
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1.

The 1946 Lease Between the Parties

On November 30, 1945, Wilford L. Whitlock am:l Leslie
D. Taylor, together with their wives. entered into two oil and
gas leases with Phillips, as lessor.

(R. 49; R

55.)

About

one year later, on November 10, 1946, Leslie D. Taylor and his
wife and Nellie Whitlock (individually and on behalf of the
estate of the deceased Wilford L. Whitlock) entered into
another oil and gas lease with Phillips.

(R. 59; R. 65.)

The

1946 lease was, by its terms, "in correction and in lieu of"
the two 1945 leases.

(R. 63; R. 69.)

As a substitute for the

two earlier leases, the 1946 lease in effect reduced the leased
acreage from 680 acres to 260 acres and leased certain lands
not covered in the 1945 leases.

The 1946 lease also diminished

the annual rental due the lessors from $105.00 to $65.00
Three of the provisions of the 1946 lease are of
special importance.

First, the habendum clause provided for a

"primary term" of six years from November 12, 1946.

The same

clause provided also that the lease would remain in effect for
as long after the expiration of the primary term "as oil or gas
or casinghead gas or either or any of them, is produced" from
the premises described in the lease.

(R. 60; R. 66.)

paragraph 12 in the lease provided in pertinent part.
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Second.

"Lessee shall have the right to unitize
. . . all or any part of the above
described lands with other lands in the
same general area . . . and in such
event, the terms, conditions and
provisions of this lease shall be
modified to conform to the terms,
conditions and provisions of such
approved . . . unit plan of develpoment
. . . and, particularly, all drilling
and development requirements of this
lease, express or implied, shall be
satisfied by compliance with the
drilling and development requirements
of such plan or agreement, and this
lease shall not terminate or expire
during the life of such plan or
agreement." (Emphasis added.)
(R. 61; R. 67)

Third, paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease provided:
"It is agreed that this lease shall
never be forfeited or cancelled for
failure to perform in whole or part any
of its implied covenants, conditions, or
stipulations until it shall have first
been finally judicially determined that
such failure exists, and after such
final determination, lessee is given a
reasonable time therefrom to comply with
any such covenants, conditions or
stipulations." (R. 62; R. 68.)

2.

The 1950 Roosevelt Unit Agreement

In 1950, pursuant to the 1946 lease's unitization
clause in paragraph 12, Phillips entered into a Unit Agreement,
by which it committed the leased lands to the Roosevelt Unit.

(R

136 in Case No

19161.

Paragraph 16(b) of the Unit

Agreement. dated November 7, 1950, provided:

-5-

"Drilling and producing operations
performed hereunder upon any tract of
unitized lands will be accepted and
deemed to be performed upon and for
the benefit of each and every tract of
unitized land, and no lease shall be
deemed to expire by re~son of failure
to drill or to produce wells situated
on land therein embraced."
(R. 141 in Case No. 19161.)

Paragraph 16(d) provided:

"Each lease .
. of any land
committed to this agreement, which,
by its terms might expire prior to
the termination of this agreement, is
hereby extended beyond any such term
so provided therein so that it shall
be continued in full force and effect
for and during the term of this
agreement, subject to the rental
provisions of paragraph 13 hereof."
(Id.)

Section 13 of the Unit Agreement provided in pertinent

part that the lessees of privately owned land committed to the
Roosevelt Unit would, as to leased lands lying outside the unit
boundaries, continue to pay the appropriate percentage of the
"delay rentals" specified in the lease as the means of
continuing the lease "in effect beyond the primary term."

(Id.)

The initial participating area of the Roosevelt Unit
contained all of the lands leased under the 1946 lease.
Effective February 1, 1952, and with the approval of the United
States Department of Interior, the participating area was
contracted to exclude a portion of the leased premises.
Appellants' Brief, Case No. 19161, at p. 7.)
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(~ee

About six weeks

later, on March 11, 1952, Nellie Whitlock, Leslie D. Taylor and
~udrey

W. Taylor executed an "Agreement" in which they (1)

acknowledged that Phillips' execution of the Roosevelt Unit
Agreement was "a proper and binding action" under paragraph 12
of the 1946 lease, (2) ratified and approved the terms of the
Unit Agreement, and (3) confirmed the 1946 lease as modified by
the Unit Agreement.

(R. 148-49 in Case. No. 19161.)

Production of oil and gas in the Roosevelt Unit began
with the effective date of the Unit Agreement in 1950 (R. 225
in Case No. 19161) and has continued without interruption to
the present.
3.

The 1954 Lease Between the Parties

On October 25, 1954, Phillips entered into another oil
and gas lease with the same lessors, that is, Mr. and Mrs.
Taylor and Mrs. Whitlock.

(R. 71 in Case No. 19161.)

Although

this 1954 lease covered a portion of the property covered by
the 1946 lease, it did not refer to the 1946 lease.

Several

months later, on April 8, 1955, Phillips executed a release of
its rights under the 1954 lease.

(R. 74 in Case No. 19161.)

This document, entitled "Release of Oil and Gas Leases,"
provided:
"This instrument shall not be
construed to effect a release of any
rights which the undersigned
[Phillips] may hold in any lands not
specifically described in Exh1b1t

-7-

'A' or under any oil and gas lease
or leases not specifically described
in Exhibit 'A' whether or not such
lease or leases cove~ lands
des er i ~ed_}n_ Exhj !?i! •A• . "
(R. 74 in Case No. 19161; emphasis added.)

Exhibit "A" to the

Release referred to the 1954 lease but did not refer to the
1946 lease between Phillips and the Whitlock and Taylor
lessors.

(R. 76 in Case No. 19161.)
4.

Appellants' Demand for Release of
Acreage Covered by the 1946 Lease

Appellants Fazzio and Taylor are successors in
interest to the original lessors under the 1946 lease.

From

the early 1950's to the present Phillips has paid or tendered
to appellants or their predecessors (1) royalties for their
percentage of production from the Roosevelt Unit and (2) delay
rentals on leased lands lying outside the Roosevelt Unit, all
in accordance with the terms of the 1946 lease as modified by
the Unit Agreement.

In October 1981, appellants' former

attorney, Mr. Carl H. Noel, demanded a release of Phillips'
rights under the 1946 lease and directed Phillips not to
continue payment of delay rentals.
19161.)

(R. 152 in Case No.

As indicated above, however, Phillips has continued t:

tender delay rentals to appellants to the present.

(R. 281 in

Case No. 19161.)
At no time until the filing of these actions did
appellants, their predecessors or their attorneys tell

-8-

Phi 1 ''

ti!at
1ed,~

it was in violation of any implied covenant under the 1946

,r demand compliance with any such implied covenant.
ARGUMENT
In these actions, appellants have challenged the

validity of an oil and gas lease that has been of record for
more than 36 years.

Phillips has performed its obligations

under the 1946 lease from its inception to the present, and,
until recently. appellants or their predecessors have accepted
all of the benefits of Phillips' performance.

Although

appellants urge the Court to find disputed factual issues, this
appeal hinges entirely upon the plain terms of the 1946 lease
as modified by the Roosevelt Unit Agreement, which the original
lessors ratified and adopted.
In its motions to dismiss below, Phillips properly
submitted to the District Court materials either specifically
referred to in the Amended Complaints (that is, the Roosevelt
Unit Agreement and Carl H. Noel's 1981 letter to Phillips) or
closely related to the allegations in the Amended Complaint
(that is, the lessors' 1952 Ratification of the Roosevelt Unit
Agreement).

The District Court properly considered these

materials and, further, gave appellants opportunity to submit
"ddit1onal materials on pertinent issues.
11 1st,1cr
Jf

In doing so, the

court complied with the directive of Rule 12_, Utah
Civil Pr_oc_e_dure:

-9-

"If, on a motion asserting defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one
summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity
~esent all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56."

ror

(Emphasis added.)

The District court, then, properly treated

Phillips' motions as motions for summary judgment, and this
Court's review of the judgments below must observe the standard
of review applicable to judgments entered under Rule 56.
Under Rule 56(e), a party opposing summary judgment
may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials in his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
[Rule 56), must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."

I f the opposing party does not

respond with specific facts properly supported, "summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
happened in these cases.

Rule

That is precisely what

Appellants submitted materials to the

District Court that wholly ignored the critical issues.
Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a material
and disputed factual issue. and judgment was correctly entered
against them.
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I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT APPELLANTS' CLAIMS BASED UPON
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF IMPLIED
COVENANTS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE
The central issue raised by appellants is whether they
may sue Phillips for breach of implied covenants under the 1946
lease, where this Court has never recognized the existence of
such implied covenants, where appellants never gave Phillips
notice of any such breach or the opportunity to cure (indeed
where appellants' only notice to Phillips contradicted their
reliance on implied covenants), and where the lease itself
negates an action based on implied covenants.

In their Fifth

and Sixth Causes of Action in Case No. 19161 and the Third and
Fourth Causes of Action in Case No. 19160, appellants alleged
that Phillips breached "an implied covenant to further develop
the leasehold property" and "an implied covenant of further
exploration."

The District Court held that appellants failed

to give Phillips either adequate notice of the alleged breach
or an opportunity to cure any such breach.

(R. 121; 259.)

In

daing so, the District court selected only one of several
•easnns presented to it why these claims were not actionable as

-11-

a matter of law.

We submit that for any of the following

reasons, the District Court's ruling on the implied covenants
claims should be affirmed.*
A.

Appellants Failed to Give
Phillips Notice of Breach and
the Opportunity to Cure, As a
Matter of Law

Appellants' implied covenant claims are fundamentally
inconsistent with other claims in these cases in which
appellants assert that Phillips' leasehold long ago terminated
or was never lawfully obtained.

Appellants cannot consistently

say (as in their implied covenant claims) that Phillips should
have done more on the leasehold, while at the same time saying
(as they do in other claims) that Phillips has had no right to
do anything on the leasehold.

Appellants may arguably elect to

enforce implied covenants or to insist upon termination, but
they may not do both.

See, e.g., Indian Territory Operating

Co. v. Bridge Petroleum Co., 500 F. Supp. 499, 451 (W.D. Okla.

*

This Court has held that when a district court's ruling is
correct, it will be affirmed even though the district court
may have stated insufficient grounds to support it. See,
~. Tree----"'-'--White, 110 Utah 223, 171 P 2d 398 (1946).

-12-

1980) (holding that the lessor waived its right to claim
termination of an oil and gas lease by demanding that the
i~ssee

comply with the lease's implied covenants).
To protect lessees from the risks entailed in acting on

such inconsistent claims, the law requires the lessor to notify
the lessee of his breach.

Specifically, the courts in every

jurisdiction to consider the question have held that, as a
minimal prerequisite to suit for enforcement of implied
covenants under an oil and gas lease, the lessor must prove
that he gave the lessee notice of the breach and a reasonable
opportunity after notice to effect a cure.

See, e.g., Superior

Oil Co. v. Devon Corp. 604 F.2d 1063, 1069-72 (8th Cir. 1979)
("[A]n oil and gas lease will not be cancelled for breach of an
implied covenant without the lessor having first given the
lessee notice of the breach and demanding that the terms of the
implied covenant be complied with within a reasonable time.'');
V!Bc.f'!i:i_t v. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., 620 P.2d 910, 916 (Okla.
App. 1980); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp. 61,
64 (D. Kan. 1966); Savoy. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp.
607, 610 (W. D. La. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964);
Montana Easterp EiJ:>elinLlo. v. Shell Oil Co., 216 F. Supp.
214, 221
Kunc v
:',f,

(D.

Mont. 1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1965);

Har~er~Jurne~_Oil

Martin

v_G~~f.

Co., 297 P.2d 371, 377-78 (Okla.

158 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1942).
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Presumably with the foregoing authorities in mind,
appellants alleged in their Amended Complaints that their
attorney, Carl H. Noel, notified Phillips of the two alleged
breaches of implied covenants in his demand letter of October
19, 1980.

(R. 42; R. 48.)

Carl Noel's demand letter of that

date (R. 151 in Case No. 19161), however, does not mention any
breach of any implied covenant, does not mention any implied
covenant, and certainly does not demand compliance with any
such covenant within a reasonable time.

Instead, Mr. Noel's

letter complains of Phillips' "outrageous conduct" in
"proliferat[ing] quite a litter of leases" and demands release
of the 1946 lease on the basis of fraud and other theories
presented in the Amended Complaint.
Although this Court has not considered the question,
authorities in other jurisdictions hold that such a demand does
not satisfy the oil and gas lessor's obligation to give notice
of the breach and an opportunity to cure.

Professor Summers

has stated in this regard:
"[B]efore the lessor can secure
cancellation of a lease for breach of an
implied covenant he must put the lessee
in default by giving the lessee notice
that compliance with the particular
covenant is required and allowing the
lessee a reasonable time within which to
comply .
The notice in such cases
must:_ be unequivoc-al and be addresse:::: tQ
th_e current situation
It must embcJdy_;,
demand for-fu_gher __de·:elopment within ~
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I_easo~able time under pain of
forfeiture; a notice which attempts to
declare an immediate forfeiture is
ineffective."

w.L Summers, Law of Oil & Gas §469 (1958) (emphasis added).
The present cases are closely similar to Kunc v.
~arper-Turner

Oil Co., 297 P.2d 371 (Okla. 1956), in which

plaintiff lessor contended that defendant lessee had breached
its obligation to develop an oil and gas lease in a reasonably
prudent manner.

Defendant countered that no notice of its

alleged breach had been given.

Plaintiff replied that its

letter, which demanded a release of the leased acreage, was
adequate notice.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court's conclusion that plaintiff's notice was legally
insufficient:
"The notice given to the lessee . . .
simply notified the defendant that it
had forfeited and allowed to lapse and
abandoned the lease and demanded that
it be released of record and that entry
or operation upon the land would
constitute a trespass . . .
"This notice certainly does not
constitute notice to further develop,
but in fact forbids any further effort
in that direction."
2g7 P

2d at 377.

The Kunc court concluded:

"The rule is well established that
where lessors seek the cancellation of
a lease on the ground that it has not
been properly developed. the lessors
must give notice ~hat they demand the
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drilling of an additional well or wells
and that failure to comply by the
lessee will result in an action to
declare the undeveloped portion of the
lease forfeited and cancelled, and that
the lessee is entitled to a reasonable
time after such notice ~o commence
operations to comply with the notice
and demand."
Id. at 377-78.

Accord:

Sadler v. Public National Bank

& Trust

fQ_,_, 172 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 1949) (holding that a

"written demand that the lease be released of record" could not
"take the place of the required not ice of demand to develop.").
Phillips does not contend, as appellants state, that
the law requires a particular form of notice to the lessee.

We

simply urge that the law requires some notice of default and
some demand for further development or exploration as
prerequisites to a suit based upon the alleged breach of an
implied covenant under an oil and gas lease.

If Carl Noel's

letter was adequate notice and demand, as appellants contend.
then every oil lessee in this State will be required to risk
the enormous sums entailed in development of oil wells in the
face of the lessor's unequivocal statement that the lessee's
interest is nonexistent and that he has no right to conduct
operations on the leasehold.

Mr. Noel's letter, in short. feil

short of the required notice because it effectively forbade
Phillips from further occupation of the leasehold.

Appellants

were unable to produce any other evidence suggesting the tvpe
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of

notice or demand required by the authorities.

The District

tourt therefore correctly entered judgment for Phillips on the
breach of implied covenant claims.
B.

The Unitization Clause in the
1946 Lease Precludes Suit For
Breach of Implied Covenants

Even more fundamentally, the 1946 lease itself
precludes appellants' claims for breach of implied covenants.
Paragraph 12 of the lease (quoted at length at page 5 of this
brief) authorized Phillips to unitize "all or any part" of the
leased lands.

In the event of unitization, paragraph 12

continues, "all drilling or development requirements of this
lease, express or implied, shall be satisfied by compliance
with the drilling and development requirements" of the
unitization agreement.
follows:

Paragraph 12 concludes the matter as

"[T]his lease shall not terminate or expire during

the life of such [unitization] plan or agreement."
Appellants have never contended that Phillips failed
to comply with the terms of the Roosevelt Unit Agreement.

To

the contrary, appellants' contention is that compliance with
the Roosevelt Unit Agreement is not enough to discharge
Phillips' implied covenants under the lease.

The implied

covendnt claims flatly contradict the parties' agreement in
~~rAgraph

·~J

12 of the lease.

The original parties to the lease

that Phillips' leasehold would continue for the life of
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the Roosevelt Unit, and appellants cannot enforce a different
arrangement by reference to the alleged violation of implied
covenants which are fully satisfied, according to the lease
C.

The Judicial Ascertainment
Clause in the 1946 Lease
Precludes Appellants' Implied
Covenant Claims

Under paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease (quoted in full
at page 5 of this brief), the most that appellants could
request of the District Court is a determination that a breach
occurred and a direction that, within a reasonable time after
judgment, the breach must be cured or Phillips will lose its
rights under the lease.

Appellants may not seek immediate

forfeiture or damages, which were the only remedies requested
in the Amended Complaints.
Paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease is known in the oil and
gas industry as a "judicial ascertainment clause" and is
common.

See 4 H.R. __ \,Ji_lUarns & L_.L_Mejlers, Oil_&Gas Law §682

(1981).

According to Williams and Myers, judicial

ascertainment clauses are generally enforced as written
"Where cancellation is made of a lease with a judicial
ascertainment clause, the decree will typically be
conditioned:

that is. the decree will provide for

cancell3t10~

unless the lessee within a stated period complies with his
obligations."

Id. §682 1.
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Where, as here, the lessor asks not for such a
·:11ditional decree, but for immediate cancellation and damages,
ht fails to state an actionable claim.
01L~·

In Keuhne v. Samedan

626 P.2d 1035 (Wyo. 1981), the Wyoming Supreme Court

considered the effect of a judicial ascertainment clause like
paragraph 17 of the present lease, in a dispute that is
identical to the present one.

The lessors there alleged that

the lessee had violated implied covenants to further develop
and further explore on leased lands lying outside a producing
unit.

The remedy they sought was cancellation.

c0urt awarded summary judgment for the lessee.

The trial
On appeal, the

Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed:
"[The judicial ascertainment clause]
could not more clearly state that
the only way to approach the problem
of implied covenants is to seek a
final judicial determination that
there is a failure to perform or a
default by lessee of some implied
covenant and the lessee is afforded
a reasonable time after that to
correct any breach or default found
to exist. There is no question that
such a final judicial determination
has not been made and if made that
appellees have not been accorded a
reasonable opportunity to correct
the default. Until these conditions
precedent_ have- b~~n m_e_t--;-tliere can
be no termination, forfeiture or
canceTlat ion -o£tfle-iease.and no
genuine issue-2F m-atf_r_iaftact
exists."
'rl

at 1040 (emphasis added).
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These authorities likewise compel the conclusion that
the District Court's judgment should be affirmed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT APPELLANTS' FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
FAILED TO STATE AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM
In the First Cause of Action of both Amended
Complaints below, appellants contended that the 1946 lease was
induced by an act of fraud allegedly committed about 37 years
ago.

The crux of this claim is that the 1945 leases were

invalid because Phillips was "not authorized to do business in
the State of Utah" when they were executed in 1945, and that
Phillips "only became authorized to do business" in Utah in
June, 1946.

Appellants claim that Phillips induced their

predecessors to execute the 1946 lease for the undisclosed
purpose of validating the 1945 leases and that Phillips never
told its lessors that the 1945 leases were "void."

In short,

appellants alleged that Phillips fraudulently omitted to state
a "fact" -- that the 1945 leases were void

and thereby

fraudulently obtained the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and
Mrs. Whitlock on the 1946 lease.
Phillips need not explain all of the reasons why this
fraud claim is implausible

The 1945 leases and the 1946 le3se

contain significantly different terms and in part cover
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~1fferent

pieces of property.

The differences between these

1eases indicate that the real reason for the 1946 lease was to
enable the parties to strike a·different deal.

Appellants'

predecessors plainly wanted to enter into the 1946 lease,
because they did it.

This alone suggests that Phillips'

previous qualification status would have been of no importance
to the lessors.

But apart from the extreme unlikelihood of

appellants' fraud allegations, and even apart from the
equitable problems entailed in their seeking to rescind a lease
under which Phillips has continuously performed for 37 years,
appellants' fraud claims are barred, as a matter of law, for
any of four independent reasons.

The District court held that

these claims were barred, as a matter of law, by the statute of
limitations.

(R. 120; R. 258.)

In doing so, the District

court again selected only one of several sound reasons for
dismissal presented to it.
A.

The Fraud Claims Are Barred By
the Statute of Limitations, As
a Matter of Law

Section 78-12-26(3), Utah Code Ann. (1977 Repl. Vol.),
establishes a three year limitations period for actions based
on fraud
time

The period of limitations begins to run "from the

when a reasonably prudent person would have acted

''''"'''DV discovered" the alleged fraud.
Jq4.

258, 17 P.2d 264, 270 (1932).
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~nd

Smith v. Edwards, 81
This Court's recent

cases have further held that where the plaintiff has the
Gpportunity to discover the mistake or fraud and fails to mare
ieasonable inquiry. the three-year statute of limitations runs
from the time he had opportunity.

In McConkie v. Hartman, 529

P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), plaintiffs claimed that they did not
discover the existence of fraudulent mineral reservations in
deeds assigned to them until shortly before they commenced the
action; they relied upon evidence indicating that they did not
have possession of the deeds or examine them until then.

This

Court held, however, that plaintiffs had "full opportunity to
discover the reservations in the deeds" when they were placed
in the possession of an escrow, more than eight years before
the filing of the action.

The court said:

"[A]ll of the

circumstances existing at or about the time the deeds were
recorded were such as to furnish full opportunity to the
plaintiffs for the discovery of the mistake or fraud, if any
existed."

529 P.2d at 802.

Accord:

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583

P.2d 50 (Utah 1978); McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458
P.2d 867 (1969).
In 1945, the filings required of foreign corporations
doing business in Utah were maintained. pursuant to statute, i~.
hoth the office of the County Clerk and the off ice of the
Secretary of State.

See Utah Code Ann

§18-8-1 (1943)

appellants' predecessors had easy access to information
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Thus

,plating to Phillips' qualification to do business in Utah -,,

~h1llips'

status in that regard mattered to them at all.

If

fh1Jlips' qualification or failure to qualify was material to
Mt

and Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Whitlock, they should at least

have consulted the County Record to learn the truth.

Having

failed to do so, they and their predecessors are barred from
seeking relief for the alleged fraud more than three decades
later, as a matter of law.
B.

The Fraud Claims Do Not Involve
a Misrepresentation of Fact

Appellants' fraud theory hangs entirely on Phillips'
alleged failure to offer its lessors what amounts to a legal
QI>inion as to the validity of its 1945 leases.

As of 1946 (the

year of the alleged fraud), Phillips' capacity or lack of
capacity to execute binding Utah leases in 1945 was far from
certain, depending upon such factors as the amount of business
Phillips transacted in Utah before 1945 and the burden on
interstate commerce resulting from any state-imposed
disability.

~~~~.

Marchant v. National Reserve Co., 103

Utah 530, 137 P.2d 331 (1943) (holding that for a foreign
corp•Jrat1on to be "doing business" in Utah, and therefore to
subject itself to Utah's requirements for qualification, the
·'''l"··rat1on must have been engaged in "a continuing course of
,, .., . ·

1

n the state rather than "a few isolated
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transactions"); William C. Moore & Co. v. Sanchez, 6 Utah 2d
J09, 313 P.2d 461 (1957) (holding Utah's foreign corporation
qualification act unconstitutional as applied to transactions
in interstate commerce).

Since 1961, the law in Utah has been

that the "failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a
certificate of authority to transact business in this state
shall not impair the validity of any contract or act of such
corporation."

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-120 (1973 Repl. Vol.).

In

other words, the "fact" allegedly misrepresented to appellants'
predecessors has not been a "fact" for more than 20 years in
this state.
These considerations underscore the wisdom of the rule
that actionable fraud entails the misrepresentation of a
presently existing fact.

A misrepresentation of law or an

omission to disclose a legal conclusion -- such as that the
1945 leases were invalid -- is never actionable as fraud.

As

this Court held in Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Co., 80 Utah
52, 60, 12 P.2d 623, 626

(1932), "The general rule is that

misprepresentations of law or of the legal effect of contracts
and writings do not constitute remedial fraud."
Pleasants v. Home Federal Savings & Loan
261, 264 (Ariz. App. 1977);
Musko~Discpunt

Accord:

Assoc~tion,

569 P.2d

First_ll~i_o_~L~ant_j.._J_r\1~1:_~0-'-\'

House. 382 P.2d 137, 139 (Okla. 1963).

rule should apply with greater force where, as here, the
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The

alleged fraud consisted in Phillips' alleged failure to
disclose a very questionable conclusion of law.

The District

Court correctly dismissed the fraud claims because appellants
failed to allege the misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact.
C.

Appellants Failed to Allege
Facts Forming the Basis of a
Duty to Speak

Appellants failed to allege facts that would justify
charging Phillips with the duty to disclose its authoriziation
to do business in Utah.

A fraudulent omission is actionable

only where the defendant had a duty to disclose the facts
omitted.

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369,

1373 (Utah 1980).

Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, required

appellants to plead each of the elements of fraud with
particularity, including the basis for any such duty to speak.
For this additional reason, the District Court's dismissal
should be affirmed.
D.

Most Appellants Lack Standing To
Sue Phillips for Fraud

With the exception of appellant Audrey W. Taylor, who
was one of Phillips' original lessors, all of the appellants
lack standing to assert the fraud claims.

Appellants cannot

maintain an action for fraud as to their predecessors in
,,,teiest

where they themselves have not been defrauded.
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In

Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962), this Court
affirmed dismissal of a claim of fraud in the sale of real
property on the ground that the defenuant seller's alleged
misrepresentation was made to an intermediate purchaser rather
than to plaintiff, who was a remote purchaser of the property.
In language directly pertinent to the present cases, Ellis held
"If a person fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation of facts to another
with the intent that it will be
transmitted to a third person, the
latter may have a cause of action
against the misrepresenter. The
instant complaint fails to allege
that [defendant] intended the
misrepresentation to be transmitted
to [plaintiff] or anyone else and
must, therefore, fail."
13 Utah 2d at 283, 373 P.2d at 385.

Accord:

Sponseller v.

Meltebeke, 570 P.2d 974, 975 (Ore. 1977); Peerless Mills, Inc.
v. American Tel.

& Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445, 449-50 (2nd Cir.

1975); Atlantic Bank v. Sutton Associates, Inc., 321 N.Y.S. 2d
380, 381 (App. Div. 1971); Metric Investments, Inc. v.
Patterson, 244 A.2d 311, 315 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1968).
As in Ellis and these other authorities, appellants
failed to allege that they relied upon or were otherwise induced
to take action by Phillips' alleged nondisclosure, in 1946, of
its qualification status in 1945.

It is simply incredible to

suppose, moreover, that the "fact" allegedly omitted has ever
been of any importance to anyone but appellants' lawyers
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In

Jny event, the District Court's judgment should be affirmed for
~his

additional reason.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE 1946 LEASE WAS VALID
In the Second Cause of Action of both Amended
Complaints below, apellants asserted that the 1946 lease was
void ab initio.

They claimed that the 1946 lease was no more

than "a corrective conveyance" and, as such, "related back to"
the 1945 leases, which they claimed were void because Phillips
was not qualified to do business in Utah when it executed
them.

Although Phillips was unquestionably qualified to do

business in Utah when it executed the 1946 lease, that lease
could never be valid, appellants asserted, because it merely
corrected the allegedly void 1945 leases.

The District Court

rejected this theory on the ground that the 1946 lease did not
"relate back" to the 1945 leases.

Rather, the 1946 lease,

embodying different terms, was "in lieu of" -- was substituted
for -- the earlier leases.

The District Court concluded that

the 1946 lease, according to its unambiguous language,
constituted a new arrangement between the parties and could not
be impaired by reason of Phillips' alleged lack of capacity to
1xecute previous conveyances in this state.
The 1946 lease states:
'' ,,f

(R. 120; R. 258.)

"This is in correction and in

two leases both dated November 30, 1945 . . . . "

-27-

~R.63;

R. 69.)

The parties c-ould not have more clearly statej

their intention to replace the 1945 leases with the 1946
lease.

Appellants' present suggestion that the lease is

ambiguous in this regard -- requiring the presentation 6f
extrinsic evidence of intent -- ignores the plain meaning of
the words of the lease.
But there is an even more compelling reason why the
District Court's dismissal of the Second Cause of Action must
be affirmed:

under Utah law neither the 1946 lease nor the

1945 leases could be held void for Phillips' alleged failure to

comply with Utah's 1945 qualification statutes.

As indicated

earlier in this brief, "The failure of a foreign corporation tc
obtain a certificate of authority to transact business in this
state shall_E.2!_jmpair the validity_Qf_a!!Y_contract or ac_t--2.f
such corporation .

Utah__Cod.euAnn. §16-10-120 (1973

Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added).

Appellants' Second Cause of

Action proceeded from the incorrect premise that the District
Court might negate the lease of a foreign corporation solely

t~

reason of its failure to obtain a certificate of authority to
do business.

The Legislature has unconditionally prohibited

the courts from doing so

These claims were properly dism1si··
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IV.

TEE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT PHILLIPS DID NOT RELEASE ITS
JUGHTS-uNDER TEE 1946 LEASE
The Third Cause of Action in Case No. 19161 claims
that Phillips' 1955 release of its rights under the 1954 lease
effectively released the 1946 lease as well.

The two-step

theory behind this contention is (1) that the 1946 lease
"merged" into the 1954 lease by operation of law, and (2) in
later releasing the 1954 leasehold, Phillips gave up all of the
rights it ever acquired from the Taylors and Whitlocks.

Thus,

according to appellants, the 1946 lease has been a nullity
since 1955.

A number of questions naturally come to mind.

Why

did it take the lessors 27 years to decide that Phillips has no
leasehold 7

Why did appellants or their predecessors accept

royalty and rental checks for nearly three decades if the 1946
lease was a nullity?

Why do appellants now insist that

Phillips should have done more to develop the leasehold if the
leasehold has not existed for more than 27 years?
The District Court rejected the Third Cause of Action
~n

two grounds.

First, the 1954 lease did not include all of

the lands covered by the 1946 lease, was a separate and
~'S'1nct

'rs'

lease, and nothing "merged" into it.

Second,

release of the 1954 lease explicitly related only to

'• ise and left the 1946 lease undisturbed.
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(R. 259 in

Case No. 19161.)

The District Court's ruling is virtually the

only conclusion to reach from the instruments in the record
In 1954, Phillips owned a leasehold interest in all of
the land embraced in the 1946 lease for a term that extended
for as long as the Roosevelt Unit should produce.

Its 1954

lease covered only a portion of the 1946 leasehold; it made no
mention of the 1946 lease, and there is nothing in that later
lease to suggest that Phillips intended to shrink its
preexistent leasehold.

Further, the 1955 release stated

unequivocally that it was not intended to affect Phillips'
rights under the 1946 lease:
"This instrument shall not be
construed to effect or release of any
rights which [Phillips] may hold in
any lands not specifically described
in . . . Exhibit 'A' or under any oil
and gas lease .
. not specifically
described in Exhibit 'A' whether or
not such lease . . . cover[s] any
lands described in Exhibit 'A'."
(R. 74 in Case No. 19161.)

Not only was it against Phillips'

obvious interest to effect a merger of its 1946 leasehold into
the 1954 lease; Phillips explicitly negated any intention of
disturbing the 1946 lease.

Under Utah law, these facts dispose

of the merger issue.
In Chausse v.

BE-nLoU~rl_a_rid.

71 Utah 586, 268 P.781

(1928), this Court considered the legal sufficiency of a
pleading precisely analogous to appellants' merger claim
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Plaintiff there alleged that defendant's mortgages on real
pruperty merged into defendant's subsequently acquired legal
~itle

in fee.

The district court dismissed the complaint, and

the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the alleged merger
would have been against the manifest interests of defendant.
The Supreme Court quoted another authority with approval on the
question of intention:
"The intention and interest of the
party who unites the two estates in
himself will determine whether or not a
merger takes place. Where a mortgage
incumbrancer becomes the owner of the
legal title . . . a merger will not be
held to take place if it be apparent
that it was not the intention of the
owner, or if, in the absence of any
intention, the merger would be against
his manifest interest."
71 Utah at 591, 268 P. at 783.

Accord:

Utah 551, 559, 37 P.2d 770, 773 (1934).
adopted the same rule.

See,

~.

O'Reilly v. McLean, 84
Modern courts have

Anderson v. Section II,

Inc, 626 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wash. App. 1981) ("[T]he courts will
not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take
place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the
party in whom the several estates have united."); Strike v.
Trrns-West D_iscciunt
Pr Id

~Q_l:J2.,

155 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137, 92 Cal.

740, 742 (1979) ("The question is one of intention,

""!or presumed, of the person in whom the interests are
'I

ed ").
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More fundamentally, the doctrine of merger permits a
smaller estate to merge into a larger. but not the opposite
See, e.g .. Olivas v. Zambrano. 543 S W

~d

180, 182 (Tex

C1·;

App. 1976) ("Where a greater estate and a lesser estate are
acquired by the same person, the lesser is absorbed by the
greater and the estates become merged."); Tri-Bullion Corp. v.
American Smelting & Rfg. Co., 277 P.2d 293, 296 (N.M. 1954)
("[W]hen the same party becomes the owner of both a large and a
small estate in the same property, they merge and the smaller
estate becomes extinct.").

As one commentator has said, "A

greater estate can never be merged into a smaller, and if any
estate is to be extinguished, it must be the smaller."

P.W.

Lear, "Lurking Title Problems," 25 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
18-1, at 18-4 (1979).
Since it was against Phillips' obvious interest and
expressed intention to effect a merger, and since, in any
event, appellants' theory would stand the doctrine of merger on
its head. the District Court's judgment should be affirmed.
At pages 34 through 38 of their brief in Case No.
19161, appellants make the additional arguments that the 1954
lease was either a novation or a "surrender" of Phillips'
preexisting leasehold.
Amended Complaint.

Neither of these claims appeared in the

Appellants attempted to amend their amendf'

complaint, fifteen days after judgment w3s entered against
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Lhem. to state a claim for novation based on the 1954 lease.
(R

341 in Case No. 19161.)

Appellants never presented their

claim for "surrender" to the District Court, and it appears in
their brief on appeal for the first time.

The established rule

of this Court, of course, prohibits consideration of theories
of recovery that were not presented to the trial court.
~.

See,

General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238,

242, 516 P.2d 346, 348 (1973).

The same rule should apply here.

The District Court correctly denied appellants'
belated motion to amend the amended complaint to add a claim
for novation.

In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 623

(1960), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a
motion to amend the complaint after entry of summary judgment
in defendant's favor.

The Court said:

"The proposed unverified amendment does
not present a new theory, nor does it
contradict or explain the materials in
support of defendant's motion for
summary judgment . . . . While Rule
lS(a), U.R.C.P., provides that leave to
amend 'shall be freely given when
justice so requires,' the liberality of
the rule is not without limit,
particularly when nothing new or of
substance is contained in the proposed
amendment."
10
i'

Utah 2d at 270. 351 P 2d at 637.
"'

Similarly, Professor Moore

mn1ented on the identical federal rule as follows:
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"The allowance of an amendment after
dismissal, however, lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and
the court may properly deny leave to
amend where plaintiff has had several
opportunities to state a claim and has
not been able to do so, or where the
proposed amendment would not remedy the
deficiencies of the original pleading."
3 Moore's Federal Practice

~15.10

(1982).

At best, appellants' novation claim is repetitive of
their merger claim; at worst, the claim is a misuse of the
doctrine of novation.

As the term is usually used. "novation"

applies "to a transaction in which the substituted contract has
a new party.''
ed. 1972).

15 Williston on Contracts §1865 at p.582 (3rd

"Merger," on the other hand, is the term

"ordinarily used to cover contracts between the same parties
which discharge prior obligations."

Id.

Thus the doctrine of

merger, and not novation, applies to the 1954 lease. if any
such doctrine applies at all.

More importantly, the courts

have been just as cautious in novation cases as in merger cases
to insist upon proof that all of the parties clearly assented
to the substitution of the new contract for the old.
~,

Tr i-St~te Oil__ Tool

~ndu_st

Inc., 561 P.2d 714, 716 (Wyo

r ie~

In~.-~~MC _ _Ine

~e~

rgi_e_§_,

1977) (holding. as a matter of

law, that no novation occurred because "unless it is the clear
intention of the parties concerned to extinguish the old
obligation by substitution of the new one. a novation has not
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heen effected.").
:l31rn

For the same reasons that appellants' merger

was correctly dismissed their novation theory must also

te reJected.
The same must be said for appellants' new claim that
"by acceptance of this 1954 lease, [Phillips] surrendered what
interest it claimed in 1946 under the 1946 lease . . . . "
A~nts
~~~t.

Brief in Case No. 19161, at p. 35.

In Diamanti v.

68 Utah 582, 251 P.373 (1926), the only Utah case urged

by appellants in support of this theory, the facts were
strikingly different from the undisputed facts of the present
case

In Diamanti, the parties' second lease explicitly

cancelled the old lease.

68 Utah at 583, 251 P. at 374.

With

this fact in mind the Court held that new consideration for the
second lease was not necessary because "the release of one
party is the consideration for the release of the other."

Id.

In the present case, to repeat, the 1954 lease (covering only a
part of the 1946 leasehold) made no mention of the 1946 lease,
~hich

the parties continued to perform and acknowledge.

Just

as importantly, Phillips explicitly negated its intention to
release its rights under the 1946 lease.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR. AN ORD~--
DECLARING A PARTIAL:. EXPiR,A'_TION OF THE
19:..6 LEASE
.

Jn the Fourth Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint
1se

No

19161, apellants alleged that the 1946 lease
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expired in 1952 as to lands excluded from the Roosevelt Unit
participating area.

(R. 46 in Case No

19161

Although this

claim now appears in appellants' brief in a considerably
embelished form (see pages 38 to 43 of Appellants' Brief in
Case No. 19161), the argument remains essentially the same.
Appellants assert correctly that the Roosevelt Unit excluded a
portion of the 1946 leasehold.

Appellants also correctly note

that the Roosevelt Unit Agreement required Phillips to continue
delay rental payments on the excluded lands.
from this

(1)

They conclude

that the effect of these circumstances was to

"segregate" the 1946 leasehold into unitized and non-unitized
portions, and (2) that the lease expired at the end of the
primary term as to the non-unitized segment of the leasehold
The District Court dismissed this claim on the ground that
paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease explicitly extends the entire
leasehold for the duration of production on the Roosevelt
Unit.

(R. 259 in Case No. 19161.)
Appellants' central contention on appeal is that

"[t)he Unit Agreement does not require holding lands outside
the unit beyond the primary term."
No. 19161 at p. 42.
mistaken.

AJlJl~l_lants_'_Jlr_itl

in Case

Appellants could not be more clearly

Paragraph 13 of the Unit Agreement provides for the

continued payment of delay rentals on non-unitized tracts as
which is committed he1e'

the means by which "each lease
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ma]' be continued in effect beyond the primary term."

, ,., ,:ase No

19161.)

(R. 141

If there exists any question concerning

the matter, paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease itself is
dispositive.
or

Paragraph 12 authorized Phillips to unitize "all

any part" of the leasehold, and further provided that, in

the event of unitization, "this lease shall not terminate or
expire during the life" of the Unit.
19161.)

(R.

67-68 in Case No.

Both the lease and the Unit Agreement treat the

leasehold as an entirety for purposes of extending the term of
the lease.

Neither instrument evidences the intention to

"segregate" the leasehold into two estates, one of which would
terminate before the other.
Appellants' arguments on this point do not cite a
single authority in support of their position.

The reason is

that virtually all of the authorities are squarely against
them.

For example, in Mize v. Exxon Corp., 640 F.2d 637 (5th

Cir. 1981), the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in
the lessee's favor against the lessor's contention that unit
production did not extend the primary term of the lease as to
lands outside the unit.

The court of appeals said:

"A plethora of cases have firmly
established the doctrine that
operations conducted on any part of
unitized acreage, even though not
on the land under the lease in
question, fulfill the indivisible
obligation of the lessee and hold
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the entire lease beyond the primary
term. This result has been
affirmed whether the leased tract
lies entirely within the unit
[citations omitted], or only
partially within the unit
[citations omitted]. We are aware
of only one jurisdiction which has
declined to adopt this rule
[citing] Texas Gulf Producing Co.
v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65
So.2d 447 (1953)."
640 F.2d at 640.

Accord, e.g.:

Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645

S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Kuehne v. Samedan Oil
~.

626 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 1981); Somers v. Harris Trust

& Sav. Bank, 566 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Kan. App. 1977); Brixey v.
Union Oil Co., 283 F. Supp. 353, 359 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Texaco,
Inc. v. Letterman, 343 S.W.2d 726, 732-33 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961); Trawick v. Castleberry, 275 P.2d 292, 294 (Okla. 1954).
See also Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Utah 123, 135, 255 P.2d
989, 995 (1953) (stating that if oil operations on one of two
leased parcels satisfied the requirements of the lease for
extension of the term as to that parcel, the same operations
would likewise extend the lease as to the other parcel); 2 W.L.
Summers, Law of Oil & Gas §302.1 (1966).

Significantly,

Williams and Myers interpret a lease provision identical to
paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease as providing "that operations on
or production from any tract included within a unit shall be
taken and accepted as such drilling and production under the
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terms of each of the leases as to all of the acreage under such
whether included within a unit or not."

1e~;e

\ '·

6 H. R. Williams

11Yers, Oil & Gas Law §952 (1981) (emphasis added).

J

As these authorities indicate, the arrangement created
by the 1946 lease and the Unit Agreement boils down to three
simple propositions.· First, participation of the leased
premises in Roosevelt Unit production is deemed, for purposes
of the lease, to be production from the leased premises.
(Lease 112; Unit Agreement '16(b).)

Second, production from

any portion of the leased premises is sufficient to hold the
lease, in its entirety, for the duration of production.
110

(Lease

Third, during the period in which all or any portion of

the leased premises participates in Unit production, the lease
continues in effect in its entirety.
Agreement ,116(d).)

(Lease 112; Unit

Since the 1946 lease has participated in

royalties from production from 1950 to the present, the entire
lease remains in effect to the present, as a matter of law.
The District Court correctly dismissed the Fourth Cause of
Action in Case No. 19161.
CONCLUSION
This appeal is important to all oil and gas producers
·~

Utah because it challenges the legal assumptions on which

bJ,e conducted business for decades.
t~r

The established law

oil producing jurisdictions, for example, assures
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